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CASH DEPOSITS-BURDENS AND BARRIERS
IN ACCESS TO UTILITY SERVICES
Public utilities' understandably try not to dispense free service. In
order to prevent free service in the form of bad debt losses, the vast
majority of utilities require cash deposits from users they fear will default
in their monthly payments. These deposits may be quite large in absolute
amount, often equal to two or three months' estimated consumption.2
Where the applicant has a specifically ascertainable unsatisfactory credit
rating, the amounts may be much larger. Sums of $50.00 and $100.00
are frequent," but the amount may range as high as $500.00.' In any case,
payment of these deposits, when demanded, is a precondition to service.
State statutes and common law uniformly require utilities to pay
interest on the deposits they have collected. The rates required vary from
about 4% to 6%.' While these rates are comparable to those available
to low income consumers in time deposits at commercial savings
institutions, they represent a saving for the utilities over the interest rates
they customarily pay on borrowed capital." This interest saving is
'This Comment is confined to those publicly and privately owned utilities that provide
water, gas, electricity, and telephone services to their customers upon the payment of user
charges. It is not directed, therefore, at the provision of those municipal services which
are financed out of general revenues or lump sum payments unrelated to the immediate
variable cost of their use. Its reasoning and conclusions, however, may be applicable to
those municipal services not furnished by public utilities which are priced in relation to
incremental cost.
' Note, Public Utilities and the Poor: The Requirement of Cash Deposits from
Domestic Consumers, 78 YALE L.J. 448, 448-49 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Public
Utilities and the Poor]. Public Utilities and the Poor extensively examines the impact of
deposits on the poor. It does not argue, however, that current deposit practices are
unconstitutional. Id. 450 n.15. The aim of the present Comment is to articulate a basis
under both constitutional law and traditional public utility law to challenge the validity
of utility deposits in light of their documented impact upon the poor. While this Comment
will contain sufficient factual data to justify these arguments, a full survey of current
deposit practices is not attempted. For greater factual detail, see id. Cf Note, The Shutoff
of Utility Services for Nonpayment: A Plight of the Poor, 46 WASH. L. REV. 745 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Shutoff of Utility Services].
When gas is to be used for heating, the Southern Connecticut Gas Co. requires a
minimum deposit of $50.00. Twenty-one percent of the 209 respondents to a recent survey
in Washington, D.C., revealed that they paid gas and electric deposits in excess of $25.00.
Four paid more than $100.00. Public Utilities and the Poor449 n.7. See also Washington
Gas Light Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 40 U.S.L.W. 2352, 2353 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 1971).
See Carpenter v. Home Tel. Co., 122 Vt. 50, 163 A.2d 838 (1960).
Public Utilities and the Poor 449, 450 n.12.
New issues of Aa utility bonds were sold at a recent high of 9.4% in May, 1970. In
December, 1971, the figure was 7.1%. First National City Bank of New York,
MONTHLY ECONOMIC LETTER, February, 1972, at 5. The absolute amounts
involved are not insignificant. These amounts are small, however, relative to the utilities'
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substantial at times, but may be overstated if the deposit accounts require
considerable servicing." Although the sacrifices of the depositors alone
provide these interest savings for the utilities, these benefits eventually
aid the utilities' stockholders and are ultimately shared with all users
in the form of lower rates.'
Most states now prohibit utilities from levying a deposit on a
consumer who can demonstrate the adequacy of his credit.9 Apart from
such a demonstration, however, utilities are free from statutory
limitations on their deposit rules. Practices differ,' but most utilities use
very broad criteria of income and net worth to select those consumers
from whom they will demand a deposit." Pacific Telephone and
Telegraph Co., for example, does not require a deposit if the applicant
has worked continuously for two years prior to his application, or if he
owns a home, or if he is a professional, a private pensioner, or an
employee of a large corporation. Under these broad deposit rules it is
not surprising that the poor pay virtually all deposits, or that often high
income residential areas are exempted altogether from the impact of cash
deposits.
3
Such rules impose severe burdens on depositors without
proportionately benefitting the utilities, for deposits usually save utilities
insignificant amounts of money. For example, estimations of the
California Public Utilities Commission in 1967 showed that imposition
of deposit rules would save Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. only one-
tenth of one percent (00.1%) of its operating revenues.' These small
total capital needs. As of December 31, 1970, Pacific Telephone had $40 million in security
deposits and advance payments versus $1.9 billion outstanding in conventional long-term
debt and $2.6 billion in stockholder's equity. Moody's PUBLIC UTILITY MANUAL
1137 (1971). On the same date, American Telephone and Telegraph Co. held, nationwide,
$423.6 million in such deposits versus $18.2 billion in long-term debt and stockholder's
equity of $25.1 billion. Id. at 1080.
Public Utilities and the Poor 449; see, e.g., p. 632 infra.
SeeTAN 38 infra
'See, e.g., N.J. Bd. of Pub. Util. Comm'rs Regs. § 14:407- la; Wis. Admin. Code §
134.06 (1)(a) (1966).
'0 Public Utilities and the Poor448, 458. Some companies only impose deposits after
an individualized credit check.
Id. at 457 n.49.
12 Wood v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 4 Cal. 3d 288, 298-94, 481 P.2d 823, 825-26, 93
Cal. Rptr. 455, 457-58 (1971), appeal dismissed 92 S.Ct. 293 (1971).
13 Public Utilities and the Poor 449.
" Re the Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 77 P.U.R.3d 1, 9 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1968).
In 1967, Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. had operating revenues of about $1.24 billion
and bad debt losses of about $14.5 million. Of approximately 5.49 million accounts, the
company wrote off 0.37 million during the year as uncollectable. At that time, Pacific
Telephone had no deposit policy, but after a hearing on a rate increase, the California
Public Utilities Commission estimated that the company's new rules would have saved
1972]
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savings contrast sharply with the large burdens imposed on those
required to pay the deposits. At most, only 13.4% of those required to
pay deposits under Pacific Telephone's identification criteria were
actually expected to default.'" In short, 87% of Pacific Telephone's
deposit-paying customers were forced to furnish security for utility
service on the grounds that only 13.4% of their number might default
in their monthly payments. '6 At the same time, the majority was required
to pay in the form of higher utility rates for their share of the bad debt
losses not eliminated by the company's deposit policy. This double
burden falls on all consumers who are required to pay deposits on the
basis of such imprecise deposit criteria. An additional burden falls on
poor depositors because deposit amounts often are large in relation to
their budgets.' Moreover, unlike the affluent, the poor cannot turn so
readily to alternative utilities offering less onerous credit terms."8 In light
the company $2.9 million in 1967. The new deposit policy, requiring deposits from 10%
to 12% of the company's customers, would cost $1.5 million a year to administer. As this
procedure was only marginally superior to a random selection of depositors in identifying
likely defaulters, it could not materially affect the company's bad debt losses. While under
the chosen criteria ten to twelve percent of the company's users were expected to pay
deposits, Pacific Telephone's bad debt losses were predicted to decline only twenty per
cent or $2.9 million. Moreover, since the company anticipated operating expenses of $1.5
million a year, it would net savings of only $1.4 million a year, or one-tenth of one percent
of 1967 operating revenues of $1.24 billion.
" Nunemaker v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 80 P.U.R.3d 129, 138, 148 (Cal. Pub. Util.
Comm'n 1969). Since 6.7% of the company's customers defaulted in 1967, and since the
new rules would have reduced bad debt losses by only 20%, assuming that these amounts
are evenly distributed, only 1.34% of Pacific Telephone's customers would have both fallen
within the new deposit criteria and defaulted. As few as 10% of the company's customers
would have paid deposits in 1967 under the new rules.
" The California Public Utilities Commission attempted to defend its deposit criteria
by observing: "In 1966, PT&T conducted a study of 16,711 final accounts which were
written off as uncollectible during a 30-day period. Among the information which came
from the study was that 93 per cent of the persons having these accounts rented their living
quarters, 71 per cent had the game job for two years or less, 82 per cent had service less
than two years, 67 per cent had service less than one year and of those customers who
had service less than one year, 46 per cent had service less than three months." Id. at 138.
The Commission has stood the relevant statistical inquiry on its head. To justify a
requirement of deposits from all tenants, for example, one would have to show at least
that most renters default, not that most defaulters rent. More importantly, if the
Commission saw the need for statistics at all, it should have required a competent study.
Multiple factor analysis should have been employed to determine that combination of
variables which best identifies likely defaulters.
"See, e.g., Nunemaker v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 80 P.U.R.3d 129, 144-46 (Cal. Pub.
Util. Comm'n 1969).
" The poor are frequently dependent upon their landlord's fixed investment in a
particular utility and cannot replace gas heating by electric heating when respective rates
indicate the profitability of this change. Nor can they easily move to a dwelling or an area
served by the utility of their choice. Public Utilities and the Poor 459.
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of these burdens, the existence and application of cash deposits raise
serious issues of public utility law and constitutional law. 9
I. PUBLIC UTILITY LAW
Public utilities are extensively regulated by the state,20 in great part
because they are natural monopolies" with a marked bargaining
advantage over their customers. Public utilities provide services
continuously to small consumers whose need for these services is
constant and critical; it cannot be postponed. Accordingly, they must
meet the utilities' terms or do without service." Since these small
consumers are at such a disadvantage relative to their monopolistic
providers, the state has stepped in to protect consumer interests.
Those chosen by the state to carry out this regulation of utilities have
assumed two tasks. First, because utilities are natural monopolies, public
utility commissions must ensure the efficient allocation of resources,
supplying the discipline that the market furnishes elsewhere in the
economy. In addition, they must set rates in the public interest.' This
means not only that utility rate structures are to conform with current
" Deposit criteria which approach absolute precision in identifying likely defaulters
probably satisfy tests of public utility law or constitutional tests of due process articulated
below. However, criteria that were entirely accurate might nevertheless violate the equal
protection test proposed below at page 646, if the burden they imposed on the poor was
sufficient to outweigh the benefits to other utility users. Given estimated savings of one-
tenth of one percent of operating revenues, a negligible benefit to other users, the burden
on poor depositors must be considered overriding in importance.
No such accuracy, however, is evident in any deposit criteria known to this author.
In contrast, the gross imprecision of the deposit rules of Pacific Telephone appear to be
typical. The representative value of Pacific Telephone's credit policies, therefore, warrants
this Comment's frequent references to them. These allusions are also warranted by the
recent decisions holding Pacific Telephone's credit policies to be valid under public utility
law, Nunemaker v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 80 P.U.R.3d 129 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n
1969), and under constitutional law, Wood v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 4 Cal. 3d 288, 481 P.2d
823, 93 Cal. Rptr. 455 (1971), appeal dismisset 92 S.Ct. 293 (1971).
"' In 1964, state commissions exercised jurisdiction over telephone companies in 49
states, gas companies in 47 states, and electric companies in 46 states. The District of
Columbia regulated all three activities. Public Utilities and the Poor 452 n.21.
2 Natural monopolies arise in the provision of goods and services whose production
is marked by high initial outlays and low and decreasing marginal costs. The first entrant
into such production can, because of this cost structure, always underprice a subsequent
entrant, preventing him from recovering his high start-up costs. The first entrant therefore
becomes the only entrant. This process is reinforced where competition between two
producers is thought by society to be highly inefficient and unsettling, as it would be in
the case of two telephone companies tearing up the same city street to serve the same
neighborhood.
"C. Wilcox, PUBLIC POLICIES TOWARD BUSINESS 277 (1971).
Id. at 276.
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notions of public policy, but that public utility commissions must also
prevent utilities from exploiting their monopoly positions and their
bargaining advantages over small consumers. 4 These commissions,
however, have largely abdicated their role:
Among the many possible [rate] structures that might serve
equally well to cover costs and provide investors with a fair
return, they have made no effort to discover and adopt the one
that would best serve the public interest. Instead, they have left
the initiative in fixing particular rates to the companies, accepted
the pattern of rates established, subjected it to little scrutiny, and
made little effort to have it modified. '
Courts have been no more critical of utilities' practices than have the
state utility commissions. Despite a statutory obligation on the utilities
to serve all who apply on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms,26
utilities have been allowed wide discretion in management decisions."
Accordingly, deposit rules have been found to be reasonable, both as a
general practice ' and as applied to particular individuals.2
" The following examples demonstrate that notions of public interest have placed the
enumerated concerns above the competing value of maintaining lower rates. A utility must
take environmental, aesthetic, and recreational considerations into account in its projects.
Boston Edison Co. v. Bd. of Selectmen, 355 Mass. 79, 242 N.E.2d 868 (1968). A utility
may not discontinue service in an area where it is losing money so long as the rest of the
system is operating profitably. United Fuel Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 278 U.S. 300,
309 (1929); N.Y. ex rel. N.Y. & Queens Gas Co. v. McCall, 245 U.S. 345, 351 (1917);
Ridley Twp. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 172 Pa. Super. 472, 94 A.2d 168 (1953). Under
Washington law, a utility cannot terminate service for nonpayment without notice and
a waiting period, norcan it use the threat of termination to coerce payment for merchandise
or services rendered by the utility other than the current service being billed. The Shutoff
of Service 763. And a utility must make rate concessions to the poor. Wash. Const. art.
VIII, § 7; Wash. Rev. Code §§ 80.28.080-.100, 80.36.130.
25 Wilcox, supra note 22, at 342. For example, public utility commissions have allowed
utilities to discriminate against their smaller consumers by arranging separate, lower
charges for their other, more price-responsive users. Id.; cf TAN 18 supra The rationale
and extent for this practice have been well explored. Wilcox, supra note 22, at 330-35;
J. Bonbright, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 89, 333 (1961); R. Davidson,
PRICE DISCRIMINATION IN SELLING GAS AND ELECTRICITY 150-71
(1955).
" See, e.g., Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 453 (West 1965); N.Y. Pub. Serv. Law § 91(I)-(2)
(McKinney 1955); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 48:3-1 (1969); Wis. Stat. § 196.22 (1969).
" SeeMissouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 276,
289 (1923); Narragansett Elec. Co. v. Kennelly, 88 R.I. 56, 143 A.2d 709 (1958); Carpenter
v. Home Tel. Co., 122 Vt. 50, 163 A.2d 838 (1960).
"9 See, e.g., Berner v. Interstate Power Co., 244 Iowa 298, 57 N.W.2d 55 (1953);
Carpenter v.-Home Tel. Co., 122 Vt. 50, 163 A.2d 838 (1960).
" A utility, some courts have held, makes no arbitrary or unreasonable demand when
it seeks a deposit from an applicant where the utility has acted in good faith and in accord
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Without extensive examination of the effects of deposit practices,
courts (and commissions) sustain them for two reasons. First, as utility
debts are small, it would be unduly burdensome to collect them through
the judicial system. If there were no deposits to eliminate such debts,
they would have to be written off and passed on to paying customers
in the form of higher rates, a policy which would discriminate against
paying customers." Second, some courts reason that the threat of
termination of service for non-payment will not, alone, adequately deter
defaults." Neither of these reasons justifies deposits in their present
form.
32
The first reason masks the true issue. Since deposit rules are crudely
drawn, and do not define, even grossly, those who will actually default,"
they discriminate heavily against those from whom they are demanded
and in favor of those who escape their incidence. The true issue,
therefore, is whether this discrimination is any better than the
discrimination which would result were alternatives to deposits
required' or were the costs of bad debt losses distributed over all paying
consumers. Since a large portion of a utility's bad debts are defrayed by
non-defaulting consumers in any event,35 and since deposit-paying
consumers are only marginally more likely than others to default on their
obligations, 36 the issue lends itself to an easy answer. Deposits ought to
be avoided.
with applicable regulations. See, e.g, Carpenter v. Home Tel. Co., 122 Vt. 50, 163 A.2d
838 (1961); Underwood v. S. Cities Distrib. Co., 157 So. 160 (La. App. 1954). The burden
of proof is placed on the consumer to establish that an existing rate structure is
unreasonable. See Antioch Milling Co. v. Pub. Serv. Co., 4 Ill. 2d 200, 209, 123 N.E.2d
302, 307 (1954); City of Terre Haute v. Terre Haute Water Works, 180 N.E.2d 110, 116
(Ind. App. 1962).
" SeeOdell Smith, 78 P.U.R.3d 317, 319 (Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1969); Nunemaker
v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 80 P.U.R.3d 129, 136 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1969); Potomac
Elec. Power Co., 84 P.U.R.3d 250, 255-56 (D.C. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1970).
' Public Utilities and the Poor451. It appears to take utilities roughly 45 days from
receipt of the unpaid bill to termination of the service, although the exact figure varies
somewhat between companies. See The Shutoff of Service 770. Providing free service
during this period can be expensive for the utilities.
2 Courts and commissions also argue that deposits are necessary for utilities and not
for other businesses because the latter may turn away bad credit risks whereas the utilities
must serve them. This argument proves nothing, however, unless it is coupled with the
first reason presented in the text. Granting that utilities are likely to have greater bad debt
losses than other businesses due to their duty to serve, the real issue is how are the utilities
to pay for these losses, through deposits or through other means?
s Seep. 632 supra.
See text following note 116 infra for alternatives to deposits.
P. 632 supra.
36 Seep. 632 supra.
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The second reason, upon inspection, turns out to be a variation of
the first. Since the threat of termination alone will not deter most
defaults, deposits must be exacted as an additional deterrent. It is true
that the greater the number and size of deposits required, the smaller
will be the utility's bad debt losses. But this observation is misleading,
for an increase in bad debt losses will diminish the return to the utility's
owners only in the short run. Utility rates are set high enough to cover
all costs of operation and to earn a fair return on their investment.3 7 As
bad debt losses are a cost of operation, an increase in such losses will
diminish utility profits only until the next rate increase hearing.
The argument must therefore be refined: deposits hold down utility
rates. In this form the argument suffers the same defects as the first
argument, for rates are held down very little by current deposit practices
because most depositors do not default. 8 Moreover, current practices
hold down rates at the depositors' expense, while allowing others who
should be paying them to go free. Consequently, as in the first argument,
a balance must be struck between current deposit practices, with their
lower rates but disproportionate impact on depositors generally and the
poor in particular, and alternative practices which might necessitate
marginally higher rates but which would be more even-handed.
In striking this balance, regulators must remember that rates are to
be set in the public interest. That interest is in part an expression of
contemporary public policy which condemns economic and social
discriminations against disadvantaged groups and the poor."' That
interest is also a concern for preventing utilities from exploiting their
bargaining advantages over small consumers, as they do when, through
deposit requirements and often through general rate structures,'0 they
demand higher rates from the poor than from their other users. The
public interest is also an expression of the desire that, while non-
defaulting users should not have to pay through higher rates for the
defaults of a few, only those consumers who actually merit deposits
should have to pay them. Fully articulated, therefore, the public interest
itself embodies a balancing of considerations for and against deposits.
Given the impact and imprecision of current deposit practices, courts
and commissions should have no trouble in striking this balance against
deposits. As shall be shown below, their failure to uphold the public
interest has sufficiently implicated the state in utility deposit practices
so as to generate issues of constitutional dimension.
"Wilcox, supra note 22, at 293.
"Had Pacific Telephone employed a deposit policy in 1967, its rates would have been
lowered only 0.11%. See note 14 supra In other words, a customer with a monthly bill
of $20.00 would pay $19.98 under the new policy. See text following note 15 supra
" See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
,o See note 25 supra
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II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ATTACK
A. State Action
In Public Utilities Commission v. Pollack"' a case which involved
constitutional provisions controlling only governmental action," the
Supreme Court found in the activities of a privately owned but publicly
regulated bus company sufficient regulatory involvement to warrant a
finding of governmental action. The Court relied upon both the fact of
regulation and the fact that the District of Columbia Public Uiilities
Commission had investigated the practices complained of without
finding grounds for a remedial order.'3 Since utilities are required to file
tariffs outlining their deposit practices with public commissions," and
since the commissions at their own discretion investigate the tariffs filed,
the state regulatory body's acquiescence in the deposit practices of a
utility would, under the Pollack decision, establish the state action
necessary for a claim under the fourteenth amendment. 5
Despite Pollack two courts have failed to find state action in such
acquiescence. Mere filing without more, they said, was insufficient to
establish state responsibility.' These decisions, however, appear to stray
from the line of contrary ruling handed down by the Supreme Court.
Almost a decade before Pollack, the Court in Smith v. Allwighf held
that heavy regulation of the Democratic Party made it an arm of the
state. Labor union abuse of "monopoly" power granted by the state has
also been thought by several Justices to amount to state action.' 8 Hence,
4' 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
"The first and fifth amendments were in issue. Id.
I d. at 462; cf Railway Employees' Dep't v. Hanson, 251 U.S. 225, 232 (1956)
(Railway Labor Act's approval of union shop agreements notwithstanding state law to the
contrary established state responsibility for a union shop agreement made voluntarily by
private parties).
" Public Utilities and the Poor 452.
41 SeeCivil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). Such a claim may not ordinarily be asserted
in a federal district court because of 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1970). See David v. New York
Tel. Co., 40 U.S.L.W. 2676 (S.D.N.Y. April 4, 1972).
' Kadlec v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 407 F.2d 624 (7th Cir. 1969); Taglianetti v. New. Eng.
Tel. & Tel. Co., 80 R.I. 351, 103 A.2d 67 (1954). As a practical matter, the question could
be sidestepped in litigation by filing af formal complaint with the public body first and
seeking judicial review if its decision were unfavorable. Cf. Wood v. Pub. Util. Comm'n,
4 Cal. 3d 288,481 P.2d 823, 93 Cal. Rptr. 455 (1971), appealdismissed 92 S.Ct. 293 (1971).
4 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
43 International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 777, 789, 807 (1961)
(Douglas, J., concurring; Black, J., dissenting; Frankfurter, J., Harlan, J., dissenting);
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 208 (1944) (Murphy, J.,
concurring). The majorities never reached the constitutional question. Cf Wellington, The
Constitution, the Labor Union, and "Governmental Action" 78 YALE L.J. 345 (1961).
19721
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abuse of their monopoly position while subject to extensive governmental
regulation should make public utilities' deposit practices instances of
state responsibility under the fourteenth -amendment.
The result is extremely plausible. The state has given the utilities a
protected monopoly position. Unless the state in turn closely regulates
the utilities, they may employ this position as leverage to exploit users
generally and, by their 'increased bargaining advantage, smaller
consumers in particular. The state, therefore, has a duty to protect the
public because it has chosen to protect and regulate the utilities. Indeed,
in failing to discharge this duty by a closer scrutiny of utilities' deposit
practices, state regulatory bodies have deprived many consumers of due
process of law and the equal protection of the laws.
B. Due Process
The Supreme Court recently condemned as a violation of the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment state action which deprived
an individual of his means of subsistence without affording him a
hearing. In Goldberg v. Kelly,49 the Court observed that the termination
of welfare benefits without prior notice and hearing on the issue of the
recipient's eligibility "may deprive an eligiblerecipient of the very means
by which to live while he waits.""0 In Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,5
the Court, identifying a deprivation of similar severity, declared that
prejudgment garnishment "may as a practical matter drive a wage-
earning family to the wall.
5 2
In each of these cases, poor people were deprived of part or all of
their means of subsistence. For the poor a large cash deposit often
presents a similarly insurmountable burden. 3 If it is not overcome, if
the family is forced to go without heat or light or fuel for cooking or
telephone service for emergency communication, a deprivation of a
dimension similar to those in Goldberg and Sniadach has taken place.
The requirements of due process, however, are not invoked by the scope
of the taking alone. They are called into play where the deprivation is
more burdensome than the state's fiscal interest in summary
adjudication."
397 U.S. 254 (1970).
so Id at 264 (emphasis in original).
395 U.S. 337 (1969).
" Id. at 341-42.
"P. 632 supra.
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970). In Goldberg, id. at 266, the Court
found that the welfare recipient's interest in her benefits and the State's interest in
preventing loss of grants to eligible recipients outweighed the State's interest in holding
down its taxes by minimizing administrative burdens.
[Vol. 7
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A utility's demand for a security deposit amounts to summary
adjudication, for the applicant is required to pay the deposit not because
the utility has discovered him to be a bad credit risk, but because his
circumstances place him in one of the utility's grossly imprecise non-
exempt categories. 5  In order to determine whether a company's deposit
rules constitute a due process violation, therefore, a court would have
to weigh the impact of the rules on depositors (most of whom will be
poor)," together with the state's interest in requiring that utilities serve
all who apply,5" against the savings effected by the requirement of
deposits.
Rates, as we have seen, are held down very little by current deposit
rules because they are so roughly formulated; they eliminate only a small
fraction of the utility's bad debt losses. 8 Current deposit practices also
weigh heavily on the poor, who pay most deposits,59 because the amounts
involved are especially burdensome on their budgets.' In addition,
current deposit practices are unfair to all deposit-paying consumers
because the vast majority of them are not expected to default,61 and
because they also must pay in higher rates for their share of the defaults
of those users not required to pay deposits. 2 In light of this considerable
impact on depositors with only negligible savings for utilities, courts
should hold current deposit practices to be violative of the due process
clause. 3
A decision on due process grounds, together with appropriate relief
ordering more personal treatment of consumers in judging credit-
worthiness, would undoubtedly aid those who have acceptable credit
records but unfortunately fall within one of the present arbitrary deposit
categories. However, many poor people trail a bad credit record behind
them even though they may have the present means and intention to pay
their utility bills." For the poor, therefore, the individualized procedures
which comport with due process safeguards may offer no help in their
See p. 632 supra.
P. 631 supra.
P. 634 supra.
5 See note 14, supra.
"Seep. 631 supra.
"Seep. 630 supra.
" See pp. 631-32 supra.
,2 Seep. 632 supra.
See Washington Gas Light Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 40 U.S.L.W. 2352, 2353
(D.D.C. Dec. 7, 1971) (sustaining an order of the Washington, D.C., Public Utilities
Commission forbidding the utility to require deposits from any applicant unless a credit
check reveals that he is a bad credit risk).
"Public Utilities and the Poor 458.
1972)
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problem of having to raise the extra money"5 needed to pay a deposit.
For this group relief may be found in some arguments under the equal
protection clause."
C. Equal Protection
1. Irrational Classification
Utility deposit rules are not the most precise classifications of
consumers for the purpose of efficiently"7 reducing the bad debt losses
of utilities. Nevertheless, deposit rules are calculated to reduce bad debt
losses to a limited degree. While decreasing their executives' vacation
pay would not conceivably cut their default losses, any deposit policy
whose effect was more than trivial would have the desired result."
Normally this "conceivable" connection with cutting default losses
might be sufficient justification to pass the rational basis test." This view
finds support in the disturbing case of Dandridge v. William&7 0 The
opinion was disturbing due to the "dramatically real factual difference
between the cited cases and this one .... ." The majority relied on
cases involving regulation of business and related economic interests,
whereas Dandridge involved "the most basic economic needs of
impoverished human beings." In spite of this difference in impact, and
" It should be remembered that the deposit is effectively a payment required in addition
to the usual monthly bill which the poor pay along with all other users. Thus, a poor person
may be able to meet his monthly bill just as other users, but due to his poverty be unable
to gather enough money for the lump sum deposit.
"Despite the attractiveness and conceptual ease of a due process remedy, some courts
may be more comfortable articulating an equal protection remedy. See Michelman, The
Supreme Court, 1968 Term, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth
Amendmen4 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 16-19 (1969).
" "Efficiency" used in this context does not refer to its usual meaning of least dollar
cost per unit of output. Rather, efficiency here reflects the precision with which the state
achieves its announced purposes, It measures the extent to which the state's classifications
are overbroad or underinclusive in light of the goals to be achieved by these classifications.
See pp. 631-32 supra.
See, e.g, Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420, 425-26 (1961); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948); Kotch v. Bd. of River Port
Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61
(1911). In Lindsley the Court stated: "A classification having some reasonable basis does
not offend against [the equal protection clause] merely because it is not made with
mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality. . . . When the
classification in such a law is called in question, if any state of facts reasonably can be
conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was
enacted must be assumed." 220 U.S. at 78.
" 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
' Id. 485.
72 Id
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in spite of strong arguments that the maximum per family welfare grant
provisions being tested in the case were both overbroad and
underinclusive, 3 Justice Stewart declared:
[T]he concept of "overreaching" has no place in this
case....
In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not
violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the
classifications made by its laws are imperfect ....
[ . . T]he Equal Protection Clause does not require that a
State choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not
attacking the problem at all."'
The Dandridgedecision, however, may be less applicable than at first
appears. First, the idea that underinclusiveness and over-reaching are
irrelevant considerations for the rational basis test was rejected this term
in Eisenstadt v. Baird" There the Court struck down a Massachusetts
classificatory scheme under the traditional test on the specific grounds
that it was underinclusive in its reach." The deposite case may also be
facutrally distingusihed from Dandridge and the line of cases77 which
allow a state to attack some aspects without attacking all of a given
problem. In Dandridge for example, the state's objective was to aid the
poor, and for lack of funds or other reasons78 the state could not solve
all aspects of the poverty problem. In the case of utility deposits the
saving of money is the end in itself. The utilities have not simply
refrained from solving all aspects of a problem, they have affirmatively
burdened a specific group. While the rational basis test does not require
precision in classification, there must come a point when classes are so
grossly defined and imprecise as to be irrational in producing the desired
result. Utility deposit criteria which define a group of which 87% are
In dissent, Justice Marshall argued that there was little relation between the
maximum grant and the income to be generated at a minimum wage, but that if there were
any relation, large families should not be singled out to bear the burden of maintaining
this relationship. He also argued both that the employment incentive rationale was
underinclusive since many smaller families within AFDC and within the rest of the State's
welfare program could work but were not subject to this incentive, and that the incentive
was overbroad in that the heads of many large families simply could not work. Id. at
524-28 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In short, Justice Marshall argued that the State's
classifications were irrational because they did not efficiently achieve the State's own
announced purposes for the classifications. C. Dienes, To Feed the Hungry: Judicial
Retrenchment in Welfare Adjudicatio, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 555, 608 (1970).
"' Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484-87 (1971).
75 92 S. Ct. 1029 (1972).
71 Id. at 1036-38.
77 See, e.g, REA v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
7' Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486-87 (1971).
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not actually expected to default79 might well push the allowable
imprecision beyond the maximum limit.
Despite the possible erosion of Dandridge and factual distinctions,
the success of an attack against utility deposits under the rational basis
test is by no means assured." Given the inconclusiveness of our rational
basis analysis, the possibility of subjecting deposits to strict review
should be considered.
2. Strict Review
The Supreme Court has invalidated classifications under the equal
protection clause under a stricter test than that of irrationality. When
a state law formulates a suspect classification" or impinges upon a
fundamental interest,"2 the law is held unconstitutional unless supported
by a compelling state interest. At least one commentator has pointed out
that the latter part of the exercise is almost invariably academic, for if
a classification is suspect, or if it suppresses a fundamental interest, a
compelling state interest is almost never found."
Strict review is especially relevant to the question of deposit
requirements. As suggested earlier, deposit requirements under due
process and rational basis reviews may be saved by more precisely
identifying likely defaulters. Under the strict review test, however,
deposit rules would be unconstitutional regardless of how precisely they
accomplished their purpose. The rationale for security deposits, the
desire to lower expenditures, has already been held to be an insufficient
state interest. 4 As a consequence, if deposit requirements create a suspect
classification or impinge a fundamental interest, they will be held
unconstitutional.
" P. 632 supra.
,0 CfSouthwester Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Danaher, 238 U.S. 482,489-90 (1915) (dictum);
Wood v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 4 Cal. 3d 288, 296, 481 P.2d 823, 828, 93 Cal. Rptr. 455,
460 (1971), appeal dismisseg 92 S.Ct. 293 (1971). In dissent in Wood Judge Mosk argued
that the deposit rules of Pacific Telephone & Telegraph, reproduced in part at TAN 12
supra, were both overbroad and underinclusive. Id. at 301-05, 481 P.2d at 833-35, 93
Cal. Rptr. at 465-67.
" See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (race); Takahashi v. Fish and Game
Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948) (alienage); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)
(national origin).
" See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (interstate travel); Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (voting); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (criminal process);
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation).
" Comment, The Evolution ofEqualProtectio, 7 HARV. CIV. RIGHTS-CIV. LIB.
L. REV. 103, 148 (1972) [hereinafter cited as The Evolution of Equal Protection]. Cf
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
" Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969); Griffin v. Prince Edward School
Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 233 (1964).
[Vol. 7
Utility Deposits
Deposit requirements, by their very purpose, classify for burdensome
treatment those who are expected to be short of money - i.e., the poor.
Is such categorization suspect?
Despite abundant dicta that wealth is a suspect classification,"' one
court has observed that wealth classifications have been invalidated by
the Supreme Court only in conjunction with a limited number of
fundamental interests."" Nevertheless, the nature of a suspect
classification suggests that there may be times when a classification based
on wealth should be suspect even when no fundamental interest is at
stake. One commentator has identified three rationales for denominating
a classification as suspect, two of which are helpful here: (1) protection
of politically impotent minority groups, and (2) stigma of inferiority
which attaches to such classifications." Where a state disburses funds,
raised through the general revenues, on an explicit wealth basis - by,
for example, patently and as a matter of policy distributing agricultural
price support payments only to farmers with net incomes over $10,000
a year - both rationales would be satisfied" and the classification would
seem to be suspect."' In addition, the wealth classification could not be
justified as an indirect, but necessary, consequence of selling goods or
services at cost, for the state is dispensing benefits already financed
through tax revenues. Hence, the usual pricing justification for wealth
classifications could not be employed to prevent the categorization of
this classification as suspect. For these reasons, when a state furnishes
municipal services on wealth lines - by, for example, explicitly affording
more extensive police protection to high income areas than to
neighboring ghettos - as was perhaps true in a recent case,90 the
classification should be suspect.9'
s McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969); Harper v.
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19
(1956); Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286, 1287 n.1 (5th Cir. 1971) aflden banq
40 U.S.L.W. 2671 (April 11, 1972); Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 597, 487 P.2d 1241,
1250, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 610 (1971).
6 Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 604, 487 P.2d 1241, 1255, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 615
(1971).
The Evolution of Equal Protection 132; c. Dienes, supra note 73, at 597.
" Low income farmers lack the political clout to improve their position. Moreover,
one may infer that these farmers occupy an inferior status in the state's hierarchy of
interests to be protected.
" Cf Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 361 (1963) (Harlan & Stewart, JJ., dissenting
on other grounds): "The States, of course, are prohibited by the Equal Protection clause
from discriminating between 'rich' and 'poor' as such in the formulation and application
of their laws." (emphasis in original).
"Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286, 1287 n.1 (5th Cir. 1971).
" Michelman, supra note 66, at 28-29.
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Because they are so crudely constructed, utility deposit rules might
well be categorized as suspect wealth classifications. Although utilities
are not dispensing benefits already financed by imposing deposit
requirements, they are raising extra barriers to the receipt of benefits
purchased separately. To the extent, therefore, that deposit rules are so
imprecise as to render irrelevant the likelihood-of-default justification-
a variant of the pricing justification discussed above, deposit rules would
create a suspect wealth classification. The conclusion turns on how
explicitly the rules select the poor and exclusively subject them to
deposits. One who pays a deposit under Pacific Telephone's criteria
cannot have worked for two years prior to his application or for a. large
corporation currently; nor can he own a home, be a professional, or have
a private pension. An individual without any of these attributes of
economic well-being is very likely to be poor. One need not conduct an
empirical investigation of Pacific Telephone's depositors to arrive at this
conclusion. One can largely deduce it from the nature of the deposit
criteria themselves. Arguably, then, Pacific Telephone's rules as well as
other typical deposit criteria do not incidentally pick out the poor as
depositors. Patently and as a matter of policy they identify only the poor
as deserving of deposit requirements. If so, deposit rules are suspect
wealth classifications. By declaring the poor alone to be bad credit risks,
deposit rules confer the stigma of inferiority. By identifying the poor as
a minority unable to protect itself, deposit rules raise the spectre of
majoritarian abuse.9
Whether or not deposit requirements amount to suspect
classifications, their impact on the means of subsistence of poor deposit-
paying consumers might well threaten such fundamental interests as to
make them unconstitutional. The Supreme Court has held certain
interests to be fundamental in cases where ability-to-pay has arguably
impeded access to these interests: voting,"3 criminal process, 94 interstate
travel," and the marital relationship."' The Supreme Court of California
" See page 631 supra; The Evolution of Equal Protection 146-48; cf Wood v. Pub.
Util Comm'n, 4 Cal. 3d 288, 305-06, 481 P.2d 823, 836, 93 Cal. Rptr. 455, 468
(197 1)(Mosk, J., dissenting), appeal dismissed, 92 S.Ct. 293 (1971).
" Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist.,
395 U.S. 621 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
" Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970); Roberts
v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961); Burns v. Ohio,
360 U.S. 252 (1959); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
" Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). See alsoUnited States v. Guest, 383 U.S.
745 (1966); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160
(1941); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).
" Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971). Sec also Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
68, 71 (1968); Loving v. Virginia, 387 U.S. 1, 12 (1966); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
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has recently added another: education. 9" One commentator contends that
the Court has really indicated in these cases that certain interests are
inappropriate for the normal operations of the market place. These
interests are, therefore, exceptions to the general rule that it is fairest
and most efficient to condition acquisition of goods and services on
payment of their market price.98 These exceptions are made because
those interests are felt to be so basic to individual or societal welfare that
no individual may be denied them by reason of his inability to pay."
Many commentators have suggested that the essential requisites of
subsistence in modem America, including utility services,"3 deserve
insulation from the market place as much as do the interests already
declared by the Court to be fundamental.' Those citizens unable to
assure themselves of such requisites of subsistence are subjected to severe
personal deprivation not unlike that suffered by the complainants in the
criminal process cases.'" While voting and education are of significant
social and individual import, there is little to distinguish them on either
ground from unrestricted access to the essentials of subsistence. 0 3 As
Justice Marshall has observed: "It is certainly difficult to believe that
a person whose very survival is at stake would be comforted by the
knowledge that his 'fundamental rights' are preserved intact."''
Marshall's remark was part of his dissent in Dandridge v. Williams"'
a case in which the majority refused to consider Maryland's ceiling on
479 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). Although the
majority in Boddie rested on the due process clause because of the State's monopoly over
the means of dissolution of a marriage, 401 U.S. at 376, the case is most easily understood
as an equal protection decision, as was argued by the dissenters. Id. at 386, 388 (Douglas,
J., dissenting; Brennan, J., dissenting). Note that in rebutting the State's contention that
divorces cost the State money to try, the Court cited Griffin v. Illinois 351 U.S. 12 (1956),
for the proposition that a pricing justification is unacceptable where fundamental interests
are involved. 401 U.S. at 382. Note too that the remedy sought was not procedural
safeguards but waiver of filing fees, a form of "free" services like that sought in the other
equal protection cases cited in notes 87-91.
Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
"Michelman, supra note 66, at 28. The Court's holdings were actually broader than
this in that they precluded the state from conditioning access to these interests on any
economic impediments, whether these impediments arose from market-like operations,
from taxes, or from legislative or judicial rules cast in terms of ability-to-pay.
"Id. 9, 13.
Seep. 638 supra.
.O See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 66, at 13-16; The Evolution of Equal Protection
121-22; Rawls, Distributive Justice: Some Addenda, 13 NAT. L. FORUM 51 (1968).
'02 Cf Ratner, Inter-Neighborhood Denials of Equal Protection in the Provision of
Municipal Services 4 HARV. CIV. RIGHTS-CIV. LIB. L. REV. 1, 20 (1968).
'o Dienes, supra note 73, at 598.
"' Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 521 n.14 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
"'397 U.S. 471 (1970).
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AFDC payments per family as infringing a fundamental interest.
Instead, the statute was tested solely by "rationality" standards.'6 In so
doing, the Court seemed to reject the notion that access to the basic needs
of subsistence was a fundamental interest of constitutional dimensions.
It therefore ignored the apparent similarities between failure to provide
basic economic needs and deprivation of access to voting, or failure to
provide access to the criminal process, education, and the marital process
pointed out by the commentators cited above. Accordingly, if the
language of Dandridge is taken as controlling, deposit requirements do
not deprive consumers of a fundamental interest, and therefore do not
demand a compelling state interest to support them."°7
The failure to find utility service a fundamental interest does not
detract from our previous determination that utility deposits create a
suspect wealth classification. Consequently, strict review is still in order
where deposit criteria concentrate on and single out the poor for
burdensome treatment. Nevertheless, the Court's reticence to find new
suspect classifications. suggests that an alternative approach should be
explored.
3. An Alternative Approach
The Court in Dandridge failed to find a fundamental interest
because, it said, there is no explicit constitutional right on which to base
such a finding."° This language should not be taken literally, however,
for in cases both before"0 and since' Dandidge the Court has found
fundamental interests where there was no explicit constitutional
guarantee. The Court in those cases simply considered these interests
of sufficient importance to merit the extra protection afforded them.
The Dandridge Court was probably troubled by the latter part of
Justice Holmes' famous jibe at Mr. Herbert Spencer's SocialStatic: "But
a constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory,
whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the State
or of laissez faire"'" While the Dandridge Court could conceive of the
fundamentality of a family's interest in subsistence, the Court seemed
'See pp. 640-41 supra.
'n The California Supreme Court has so held. Wood v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 4 Cal. 3d
288, 294, 481 P.2d 823, 827, 93 Cal. Rptr. 455,459 (1971), appeal dismisse( 92 S.Ct. 293
(1971).
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
'" Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970); see The Evolution of Equal
Protection 128.
" Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
.. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
.. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905).
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to be unsure that a proposition of such vast economic and political
importance could be found in the Constitution."' Holmes' remark should
be distinguished. He was urging his Court to defer to the wishes of the
legislature when it undertook to regulate business behavior. In contrast,
the Dandridge Court confronted a state law that seriously impaired a
family's essentials of survival. That difference in impact should have
been grounds for finding a fundamental interest."
4
Between the extremes ofteview under the rational basis test"' and
the strict scrutiny test,'" perhaps there should be a stricter test of
rationality when basic needs are at stake. Instead of sustaining any
legislation that bears a plausible relationship to an appropriate state goal,
under the stricter rationality test courts could not validate legislation
threatening basic economic needs unless the legislation attempted to
achieve legitimate goals as efficiently as possible upon consideration of
(1) its impact on personal subsistence needs and (2) the administrative
expense and difficulty of improving efficiency of the legislation's
classifications."7 Legislation could not be sustained where more efficient
means were present to achieve the state's goals, so long as decreased
burdens upon vital personal interests outweighed any increase in
administrative costs. Many persons have felt the need for such a third
test for equal protection, one which allows a wider range of balancing
than is permissible under the current analytic framework."'
In at least one instance, the Court has apparently employed a wider
balancing test in invalidating a state law, without acknowledging its
' Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,481-82 (1970); cf Developments in the Law
-Equal Protectio, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1132 (1969).
... See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
". See text following note 71 supra116 Seep. 642 supra.
117 Thus, the presence of a subsistence need that is threatened by a state law is not simply
the trigger for the application of this "stricter rationality" test; the subsistence need is an
integral part of the actual balancing involved. Accordingly, where the personal interest
affected by the state law is viewed the the court as essential or vital, then the balance should
be heavily weighted against the state law. Where the personal interest is not viewed as vital
but is nevertheless considered important, the balance would be correspondingly less
weighted against the state law. A similar adjustment of the balance weights should occur
for interests in between these two points.
In considering the application of this stricter rationality test, therefore, a court should
not hesitate over whether a particular interest was really a subsistence need or not. So long
as the interest was considered by the court to be sufficiently important to be subsistence-
like, the court should employ the stricter rationality test, weighting the interest involved
appropriately.
... Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 523 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Wood
v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 4 Cal. 3d 288, 307, 481 P.2d 823, 837, 93 Cal. Rptr. 455, 469 (1971)
(Mosk, J., dissenting), appeal dismisse4 92 S.Ct. 293 (1971); Developments-Equal
Protection, supranote 113, at 1120-21; The Evolution of Equal Protection 149, 151, 158.
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departure from the traditional tests. In Rinaldi v. Yeager,"' the Court
struck down a New Jersey statute requiring certain unsuccessful
prisoners to pay for appellate transcripts furnished them earlier under
writs of in forma pauperi& The statute did not require reimbursement
from other unsuccessful appellants who had, however, been paroled or
put on probation instead of imprisoned. The Court held that the Statute
was not rationally related to the State's announced justifications for it.'20
Justice Harlan, however, contended that the law comported with the
Court's traditional test of rationality, for New Jersey could have found
it simpler and more advisable to collect the transcript from unsuccessful
appellants lodged in prison than from those now free in society and
attempting to begin life anew.' Under the lenient rationality standards
discussed above,' Harlan was quite probably on solid ground. In the
absence of any other possible explanation, the Court must have felt that
while its effect on the access to the appellate criminal process was not
sufficiently detrimental to initiate strict review, the law was so unfair
in this fundamental area that it was unwarranted by the small measure
of administrative and fiscal convenience it produced. Thus, although
Rinaldi did not involve the essentials of subsistence, it did present a
situation sufficiently unique to force the Court tacitly to engage in a
wider balancing than that in which it ordinarily indulges."
Deposit requirements, like the situation in Rinald demand a new
constitutional test to gauge their validity. The wooden, two-tiered test
384 U.S. 305 (1966).
"o Id. at 309- 10.
I id. at 311.
". See text following note 62 supra
' In at least two other instances the Court has departed somewhat from its rigid two-
tiered test of equal protection. It dismissed the appeal of Kirk v. Board of Regents, 273
Cal. App. 2d 430, 78 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1969), for want of a substantial federal question, 396
U.S. 554 (1970), though in sustaining California's residence requirements for attendance
at state-supported colleges, that court had attempted to distinguish Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969), in the following way: "Shapiro involved the immediate and pressing
need for preservation of life and health of persons unable to live without public assistance,
and their dependent children. Thus, the residence requirements in Shapiro could cause
great suffering and even loss of life. The durational requirement of attendance at publicly
financed institutions of higher learning do not involve similar risks." 273 Cal. App. 2d
at 439-40, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 266-67. The Court may have felt, therefore, that strict review
was invoked in Shapiro only by the presence of both an interest in interstate travel and
an interest in subsistence, a combination not present in Kirk
The other instance occurred in Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971), where
Justice Blackmun attempted to distinguish the pool-closing in Palmer from the school-
closing in Griffin v. Prince Edward School Board, 377 U.S. 218 (1964), in this way: "The
pools are not part of the city's educational system. They are a general municipal service
of the nice-to-have but not essential variety . . . ." 403 U.S. at 229 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring). For Justice Blackmun, therefore, Grffin depended upon the existence of both
a raical classification and the interest in education, a combination not present in Palmer
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fashioned by the Court does not adequately weigh their value to the
utilities against their impact on depositors. Moreover, it specifically fails
to take into account the less drastic alternatives to deposits. Utilities, for
example, could require credit risks to prepay each month's estimated
service charge as a precondition to continued service. The time of
prepayment could be sufficiently ahead of the period of service to enable
utilities to avoid the long periods between nonpayment and shutofft24
Utilities could also protect themselves and ease the budgetary problems
of the poor by eliminating large mid-winter bills that heighten defaults
by means of uniform monthly billings throughout the year. Weekly
billings and smaller monthly surcharges are also possible, but the former
are too expensive and the latter are too like deposits themselves to be
preferred over the previously suggested alternatives. t"
Given the imprecision of current deposit criteria, attempts to refine
them would probably help less than replacement of deposits by the
alternatives described. Of course, implementation of these alternatives
could result in marginally larger bad debt and administrative costs for
the utilities, who would pass them on in the form of higher rates to all
their customers. Consequently, under the wider balancing test proposed,
courts would have to weigh any projected cost increase against the
benefits accruing from the change and the burdens of present practices.
In light of the vast imprecision and the large impact of current practices,
it is highly, unlikely that this balance"6 would tip in favor of the status
quo.
III. CONCLUSION
We have seen that the impact and imprecision of deposit
requirements give rise to issues in both public utility and constitutional
law. In public utility law, the purpose of public regulation of utilities
dictates that, on balance, deposits should be replaced by feasible
alternatives. Under constitutional principles the same result was reached
through a new, stricter rationality standard of review under the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, it also being found that
the due process clause required at the very least that no deposit should
be imposed upon a consumer who was not individually established as
a credit risk.
': See note 31 supra
" Although a small surcharge obviates the problem of a lump sum payment, it
nevertheless takes from the poor depositor money which he could use on other needs.
.26 This balance has been elaborated in detail at pp. 638-39 supra.
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Utility companies are only partially subjected to the discipline of the
market. Society cannot depend, therefore, upon the market to allocate
the services of public utilities entirely in the public interest. The state
must supply the regulation which the market cannot. In the guise of
commissions and courts, however, the state has been sadly lax in
discharging these high duties. Regulatory bodies have been sufficiently
vigilant to see that deposits are not required from the rich and those with
clearly established credit, but have been indifferent to the practice of
requiring deposits from the poor and those of not clearly established
credit. Current deposit policies are convenient credit shorthands in
which most commissions and courts unhesitatingly acquiesce. The public
interest and the Constitution, however, demand more of the state than
that.
-John B. Kirkwood
